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This volume follows up a previous work by Zimmerman (UNC Greensboro), Living with 
Uncertainty (CH, Jul'09, 46-6130), and continues his investigation of the metaethics of 
uncertainty.  This installment centers on defending his favored view of moral obligation (the 
prospective view) from various criticisms he has encountered since first articulating it.  Ignorance 
and Moral Obligation includes several clarifications of the prospective view, including repeated 
emphasis on "projected" rather than "expected" outcomes.  As a straight philosophy text, this book 
will be useful for faculty and graduate students who read the previous book and found it 
interesting.  It will be less useful for those unfamiliar with Living with Uncertainty or those interested 
in an attempt to address uncertainty from anywhere other than metaethics.  For example, the 
distinction between "projected" and "expected" outcomes would be familiar to economists and other 
decision theorists; however, this literature goes unmentioned.  Moreover, one of Zimmerman’s 
repeated cases deals with "testimony" as a social epistemic source; discussion of this literature is 
also left aside.  As a metaethical defense of Zimmerman's view, this volume seems to work.  As a 
contribution to an interdisciplinary understanding of one's moral responsibilities, more work 
remains. 
Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate students and researchers/faculty. 
